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Community,	  Liability,	  and	  Just	  Conduct	  in	  War1	  
	  
(Note:	  This	  is	  an	  uncorrected	  pre-­‐publication	  draft	  of	  an	  article	  published	  in	  





Those	  of	  us	  who	  are	  not	  pacifists	   face	  an	  obvious	   challenge.	  Common-­‐sense	  
morality	   contains	   a	   stringent	   constraint	   on	   non-­‐consensual	   killing,	   typically	  
grounded	  in	  the	  idea	  that	  individuals	  possess	  basic	  rights	  against	  such	  treatment.	  
Yet	  war	  involves	  killing	  and	  maiming	  on	  a	  grand	  scale.	  Hence,	  if	  participation	  in	  
wars	   is	   to	   be	   morally	   justified,	   it	   needs	   be	   shown	   how	   this	   conflict	   can	   be	  
reconciled.	  	  
A	  major	   fault	   line	   running	   throughout	   the	   contemporary	   just	  war	   literature	  
divides	   two	  different	  approaches	   to	  attempting	   this	   reconciliation.	  According	   to	  
an	  influential	  reductivist	  view,	  defended	  most	  prominently	  by	  Jeff	  McMahan,	  the	  
conflict	   can	   be	   resolved	   by	   showing	   it	   to	   be	   largely	   illusory.	   Despite	   initial	  
appearances,	  both	  the	  resort	  to	  war	  and	  its	  conduct	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  appeal	  to	  
precisely	   the	   same	   exceptions	   to	   the	   prohibition	   on	   killing	   that	   we	   accept	   in	  
ordinary,	  non-­‐war	  contexts.2	  In	  particular,	  by	  appeal	  to	  standard	  justifications	  for	  
killing	  in	  self-­‐	  and	  other-­‐defence.	  	  
In	   opposition,	   non-­‐reductivist	   approaches	   hold	   that	   these	   considerations	   of	  
are	  insufficient	  for	  the	  task.	  Instead,	  a	  defence	  of	  our	  intuitions	  about	  permissible	  
killing	   in	   war	   requires	   us	   to	   appeal	   to	   additional,	   non-­‐standard	   forms	   of	  
justification.	  One	  prominent	  brand	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  grounds	   these	  additional	  
permissions	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   wars	   involve	   the	   use	   of	   force	   by	   groups	   or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  For	  written	   comments	   on	   drafts	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   am	   extremely	   grateful	   to	   James	   Lenman,	   Jeff	  
McMahan,	  Seth	  Lazar,	  Helen	  Frowe,	   Ian	  Fishback,	  Michael	  Neu,	   Jonathan	  Quong,	  and	  especially	  
Daniel	  Viehoff,	  Versions	  of	  this	  paper	  were	  presented	  at	  Brave	  New	  World	  2012,	  the	  Society	  for	  
Applied	  Philosophy	  Annual	  Conference	  2012,	  and	  two	  seminars	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sheffield	  in	  
2012.	  My	   thanks	   to	   the	  audience	  members	  at	   those	  events	   for	  helpful	  discussions,	  and	   to	  Saba	  
Bazargan	  for	  commenting	  on	  the	  paper	  at	  the	  SAP	  conference.	  Work	  on	  this	  paper	  was	  supported	  
by	   the	   Arts	   and	   Humanities	   Research	   Council,	   UK	   and	   the	   Society	   for	   Applied	   Philosophy,	   for	  
which	  I	  am	  very	  grateful.	  	  
2	  McMahan	  (2009).	  For	  other	  booklength	   treatments	  of	  war	   from	  a	   reductivist	  perspective,	   see	  
Fabre	  (2012)	  and	  Frowe	  (2014).	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associations	  of	   individuals	  engaged	  in	  morally	  significant	  relationships	  with	  one	  
another.	   The	   key	   claim	   is	   that	   certain	   kinds	   of	   relationship	   can	   provide	   an	  
independent	  source	  of	  permission	  for	  killing	  in	  war.	  	  
In	  this	  paper,	  I	  argue	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  should	  be	  rejected.	  The	  argument	  
pushes	   a	   dilemma	  onto	   non-­‐reductivists:	   If	   they	   are	   successful	   in	   showing	   that	  
acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  group	  can	  generate	  additional	  permissions	  to	  
kill	   in	  war,	   they	  must	   also	   jettison	   the	  most	   intuitive	   restrictions	   on	   conduct	   in	  
war	  –	  most	  saliently,	  the	  constraint	  on	  intentionally	  killing	  morally	  innocent	  non-­‐
combatants.	  Since	  this	  conclusion	  is	  unacceptable,	  non-­‐reductivism	  fails.	  
The	  paper	  proceeds	  as	  follows.	  Sections	  2-­‐4	  provide	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  
of	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  between	  reductivists	  and	  non-­‐reductivists.	  Section	  5	  sets	  out	  
the	   ‘war	  crimes’	  objection	  to	  non-­‐reductivism.	  Section	  6	  considers	  several	  ways	  
in	   which	   non-­‐reductivists	   may	   avoid	   the	   objection	   by	   providing	   an	   alternative	  
grounding	   for	   the	  constraint	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants,	  and	  argues	  that	   they	  
all	  fail.	  Section	  7	  concludes.	  
	  
2.	  The	  Reductivist	  Approach	  
	  
Reductivism	   can	   be	   characterised	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   commitment	   to	   two	   main	  
theses.3	  The	  Continuity	  Thesis	  holds	  that	  the	  moral	  principles	  that	  govern	  war	  are	  
constituted	   solely	  by	   those	   that	   govern	   the	  use	  of	   violence	  by	   individuals	   in	   all	  
other	  contexts.	  There	   is	  nothing	  morally	  special	  about	  war	  beyond	  its	  scale	  and	  
complexity.4	  While	   important,	   this	   claim	   is	   largely	   formal.	   It	   holds	   that	   the	  
morality	   of	   war	   is	   entirely	   reducible	   to	   principles	   of	   ordinary	   interpersonal	  
morality,	  while	  leaving	  it	  open	  as	  to	  what	  these	  principles	  consist	  in.	  	  
This	   substance	   is	  provided	  by	   the	  Content	  Thesis,	  which	  holds	   that	  killing	   in	  
war,	  when	   justified,	   is	   justified	   in	   one	  of	   two	  ways.	   Firstly,	   for	   reductivists,	   the	  
intentional	  killing	  of	  combatants	   is	  primarily	   justified	  by	  appeal	   to	  principles	  of	  
permissible	   killing	   in	   self-­‐	   and	   other-­‐defence.	   As	   standardly	   understood,	  
defensive	   killing	   is	   permissible	   because	   the	   subject	   of	   harm	   has	   forfeited	   their	  
normal	   right	   not	   to	   be	   killed,	   in	   virtue	   of	   being	   relevantly	   implicated	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  This	  characterisation	  of	  reductivism	  is	  indebted	  to	  the	  helpful	  discussion	  in	  Lazar	  (2014).	  
4	  For	  an	  early	  statement	  of	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis,	  see	  Glover	  (1977:	  251-­‐252).	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existence	   of	   a	   threat	   of	   serious	   harm	   to	   others.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   normal	  
constraint	  on	  homicide	  ceases	  to	  apply.	  In	  the	  relevant	  terminology,	  the	  subject	  of	  
harm	   is	   liable	   to	   lethal	  defensive	  harm,	  and	  so	  suffers	  no	  wrong	  by	  having	   that	  
harm	  imposed	  on	  them.5	  	  
Of	   course,	   liability	   justifications	   alone	   will	   not	   justify	   participation	   in	   war,	  
since	  wars	  involve	  collaterally	  killing	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  This	  requires	  a	  
second	   form	   of	   justification.	   For	   reductivists,	   such	   killing,	   when	   justified,	   is	  
justified	   on	   grounds	   of	   impartial	   lesser-­‐evil,	   usually	   in	   conjunction	   with	   some	  
version	   of	   the	   Doctrine	   of	   Double	   Effect.	   Lesser-­‐evil	   justifications	   hold	   that	   an	  
individual’s	   right	   not	   to	   be	   killed,	  while	   stringent,	   is	   not	   absolute	   and	  may	   be	  
overridden	  when	  doing	  so	   is	  required	   in	  order	   to	  bring	  about	  sufficiently	  good	  
effects,	  impartially	  considered.	  In	  such	  cases,	  the	  killing	  wrong	  its	  victim,	  in	  that	  
it	   transgresses	   their	   rights,	   but	   doing	   so	   is	   justified	   all-­‐things-­‐considered.	   The	  
Doctrine	   of	   Double	   Effect	   draws	   a	   distinction	   between	   bad	   effects	   that	   are	  
brought	   about	   as	   an	   intended	   means	   and	   bad	   effects	   that	   are	   brought	   about	  
foreseeably	  but	  unintentionally,	  and	  holds	  that	  the	   latter	  are	  subject	  to	  a	   lower	  
justificatory	  burden	  than	  the	  former,	  other	  things	  being	  equal.	  This	  discounting	  
allows	   reductivists	   to	   justify	   the	   collateral	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  
as	   the	   lesser-­‐evil,	   while	   imposing	   a	   much	   stricter	   (indeed,	   near-­‐absolute)	  
constraint	  on	  the	  intentional	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐liable	  individuals.	  
On	   a	   reductivist	   view,	   then,	   justified	   warfare	   is	   simply	   an	   aggregation	   of	  
individual	   acts	   of	   killing	   and	   injuring,	   each	   justified	  on	   the	   familiar	   grounds	  of	  
liability	  or	  lesser-­‐evil.	  	  
	  
3.	  Objections	  to	  Reductivism	  	  
	  
Despite	  its	  appeal,	  many	  think	  that	  reductivism	  must	  be	  rejected,	  or	  at	  least	  
significantly	  amended.	  One	  common	  way	  of	  supporting	  this	  view	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  class	  of	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war	  that	  it	  is	  both	  intuitively	  permissible,	  
but	  cannot	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  target’s	  liability.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  key	  debate	  among	  theorists	  of	  self-­‐defence	  concerns	  the	  correct	  rendering	  of	  the	  ‘relevantly	  
implicated’	   clause	   for	   grounding	   liability	   For	   a	   representative	   sample,	   see	   Thomson	   (1991);	  
Ferzan	  (2005);	  McMahan	  (2005);	  Quong	  (2012);	  Tadros	  (2012).	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3.1	  The	  Permissibility	  of	  Fighting	  in	  Unjust	  Wars	  
	  
One	  much	   discussed	   implication	   of	   reductivism	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   support	   the	  
common	   view,	   reinforced	   in	   the	   laws	   of	   war,	   that	   combatants	   are	   equally	  
permitted	  to	  target	  and	  kill	  their	  armed	  opponents,	  independently	  of	  the	  justice	  
of	  the	  wars	  in	  which	  they	  fight.6	  	  
Michael	   Walzer,	   one	   of	   the	   chief	   defenders	   of	   this	   “equal	   right	   to	   kill”	  
influentially	   appeals	   to	   a	   liability-­‐based	   argument	   in	   support	   of	   this	   position	  
(Walzer	  2006:	  41).	  For	  Walzer,	  by	  threatening	  their	  opponents	  with	  lethal	  harm,	  
combatants	   thereby	   lose	   their	   right	  not	   to	  be	  killed	  by	   their	  opponents	   in	   self-­‐
defence.	   Since	   all	   combatants	   are	   “dangerous	   men”,	   posing	   lethal	   threats	  
independently	  of	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  the	  wars	  in	  which	  they	  fight,	  all	  are	  liable	  to	  
be	  killed	  by	  their	  opponents	  (Walzer	  2006:	  145).	  
However,	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  argument	  is	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  a	  conception	  of	  
liability	   that	   is	   implausible	   in	   circumstances	   other	   than	   war.	   Theories	   of	   self-­‐
defence	   typically	   treat	  mere	   threat-­‐posing	   as	   insufficient	   for	   liability,	   for	   good	  
reason.	  Potential	  murder	  victims,	  for	  example,	  do	  not	  render	  themselves	  liable	  to	  
defensive	   force	   if	   they	   defend	   themselves	   against	   their	   attacker	   with	  
proportionate	  and	  necessary	  harm.	  Yet	  a	  threat-­‐based	  account	  of	  liability,	  which	  
supports	  a	  neutrally	  distributed	  permission	   to	  kill	   in	  war,	  would	   seem	   to	  have	  
precisely	  this	  implication.	  
A	  plausible	  account	  of	   liability	  then	  requires,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  the	  existence	  
of	   a	   threat	   of	   unjustified	   harm.	   This	   addition	   yields	   the	   correct	   result	   in	   the	  
murderer/victim	  case.	  Since	  the	  victim’s	  lethal	  threat	  is	  a	  justified	  response	  to	  an	  
unjustified	   attack,	   only	   the	   aggressor	   renders	   himself	   liable	   to	   defensive	   force.	  
However,	  when	  applied	   in	   the	  context	  of	  war,	   this	  account	  of	   liability	  does	  not	  
support	   a	   neutral	   permission	   to	   kill.	   The	   reasoning	   here	   parallels	   that	   in	   the	  
simple	  murderer/victim	   case,	   the	   thought	   being	   that	   combatants	   who	   fight	   in	  
justified	  wars	  against	  unjust	  aggression	  do	  nothing	   to	  render	   themselves	   liable	  
to	   defensive	   killing.	   The	  upshot	   is	   that,	   on	   a	   reductivist	   view,	   combatants	  who	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  For	  a	  very	  useful	  collection	  of	  essays	  on	  this	  topic,	  see	  Rodin	  and	  Shue	  (2008).	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fight	   and	  kill	   in	  unjust	  wars	   act	   seriously	  morally	  wrongly	   –	   they	   intentionally	  
kill	  the	  innocent	  –	  even	  if	  they	  scrupulously	  follow	  the	  rules	  of	  war.7	  	  
Despite	   this	   unorthodox	   conclusion,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	  
reductivists	   do	   not	   claim	   that	   the	   current	   legal	   regime	   governing	   war	   lacks	  
justification.	   What	   they	   do	   argue	   is	   that	   if	   the	   equal	   treatment	   of	   combatants	  
under	   the	   laws	  of	  war	   is	  morally	   justified,	   this	   is	  primarily	  due	   to	   the	  desirable	  
consequences	   of	   having	   such	   a	   rule,	   and	   not	   because	   the	   law	   reflects	   morally	  
permissible	  conduct	  on	  the	  part	  of	  combatants.8	  
While	  reductivists	  generally	  accept	  these	  revisionary	  implications,	  many	  find	  
the	  conclusion	  that	  mainstream	  just	  war	  theory	  is	  deeply	  mistaken	  and	  that	  the	  
laws	  of	  war	   lack	  deep	  moral	   foundations	   too	   counter-­‐intuitive	   to	  be	   accepted.	  9	  
Instead,	  defenders	  of	  a	  more	  traditional	  conception	  of	  permissible	  conduct	  in	  war	  
may	  draw	  a	  different	  conclusion	  from	  the	  difficulty	  of	  reconciling	  a	  permission	  to	  
fight	   in	   unjust	   wars	   with	   theories	   of	   permissible	   self-­‐defence:	   That	   the	  
permissibility	   of	   intentional	   killing	   in	   war	   cannot	   be	   determined	   primarily	   by	  
considerations	   of	   liability.	   	   Instead,	   the	   moral	   status	   of	   acts	   of	   killing	   in	   war	  
depends	   on	   other	   moral	   factors,	   which	   reductivism	   mistakenly	   fails	   to	  
accommodate.	  	  
	  
3.2	  Avoiding	  Pacifism	  
	  
A	   structurally	   similar,	   but	  more	   general,	   objection	   to	   reductivism	  holds	   that	   it	  
cannot	   justify	   the	   intentional	   killing	   of	   combatants	   even	   in	   wars	   that	   are	  
intuitively	  just,	  and	  thus	  entails	  a	  form	  of	  pacifism.	  The	  most	  powerful	  version	  of	  
this	  objection	  has	  recently	  been	  put	  forward	  by	  Seth	  Lazar,	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  
majority	  of	  combatants	  on	  both	  the	  just	  and	  unjust	  sides	  of	  war	  are	  not	  liable	  to	  
defensive	   killing	   (Lazar	   2010).	   He	   supports	   this	   conclusion	   by	   arguing	   that	  
reductivism	   faces	   a	   dilemma:	   It	   cannot	   consistently	   be	   claimed	   that	   the	  
intentional	  killing	  of	  combatants	   in	  war	   is	   justified	   in	  virtue	  of	   their	   liability	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  the	  most	  sustained	  argument	  for	  this	  conclusion,	  see	  McMahan	  (2009:	  Chs.	  1&2)	  
8	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  McMahan	  (2008).	  
9 	  Though	   for	   a	   minority	   position	   which	   endorses	   both	   reductivism	   and	   the	   equality	   of	  
combatants,	  see	  Steinhoff	  (2008).	  
	   6	  
defensive	  killing,	  while	  also	  maintaining	  a	  general	  prohibition	  on	  the	  targeting	  of	  
non-­‐combatants.	  One	  of	  these	  commitments	  has	  to	  go.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   argue	   that	   a	   sufficiently	   large	   proportion	   of	   enemy	   combatants	  
are	  liable	  to	  be	  killed,	  reductivists	  must	  set	  the	  threshold	  for	  liability	  to	  defensive	  
killing	   fairly	   low.	   	   This	   is	   required	   in	   order	   to	   render	   liable	   combatants	   who	  
make	  fairly	  small	  or	  indirect	  contributions	  to	  unjust	  wars,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  
are	   relatively	   non-­‐culpable	   for	   their	   contributions.	   Lazar	   claims	   that	   this	   will	  
include	   a	   significant	   proportion	   of	   the	   members	   of	   militaries.	   However,	   the	  
consequence	  of	   this	   low	  bar	   for	   liability,	  Lazar	  argues,	   is	   that	   it	  will	  also	   imply	  
that	   an	   unacceptably	   large	   proportion	   of	   non-­‐combatants	   on	   the	   unjust	   side	  
liable	  to	  defensive	  killing.	  There	  are	  insufficient	  differences	  between	  combatants	  
and	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  contributions	  to	  the	  war,	  and	  their	  moral	  
responsibility	   for	  doing	  so,	   that	  could	  ground	  a	  general	  difference	  in	   liability.	   If	  
combatants	   on	   the	   unjust	   side	   are	   liable	   to	   defensive	   killing,	   then	   so	   too	   are	  
many	   non-­‐combatants.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	   this	   conclusion,	   reductivists	   must	  
instead	  endorse	  a	  higher	  threshold	  of	  contributory	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  
liability.	  The	  problem	   is	   that	   this	   leads	   to	  a	  highly	  pacifistic	   conclusion.	   If	  non-­‐
combatants	  on	  the	  unjust	  side	  are	  generally	  not	   liable	  to	  defensive	  killing,	   then	  
neither	  are	  many	  combatants.	  	  
Lazar	   concludes	   that	   that	   since	   both	   the	   options	   are	   unacceptable,	  
reductivism	  must	   be	   rejected.	  What	   the	   dilemma	   reveals	   is	   that	   practically	  all	  
wars,	  whether	   just	   or	   unjust,	  will	   involve	   the	  widespread	   intentional	   killing	   of	  
non-­‐liable	  individuals.	  Hence,	  if	  any	  wars	  are	  to	  be	  justified,	  it	  cannot	  be	  because	  
combatants	  have	  rendered	  themselves	  liable	  to	  defensive	  killing,	  as	  reductivists	  
claim.	   The	   correct	   theory	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   war	   must	   appeal	   to	   other	  
considerations	  than	  those	  contained	  within	  reductivism.10	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  dust	  is	  yet	  to	  settle	  on	  this	  objection.	  One	  line	  of	  resistance	  attempts	  
to	  deny	  the	  dilemma	  directly,	  by	  arguing	  there	  are	  in	  fact	  morally	  relevant	  asymmetries	  between	  
combatants	   and	   non-­‐combatants	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   factors	   that	   ground	   liability	   (McMahan	   2009:	  
Ch.5;	  McMahan	  2011;	  Fabre	  2009).	  For	   criticism,	   see	  Frowe	   (2014:	  Ch.6).	  A	  different	   response	  
aims	  to	  show	  that	  revising	  the	  relevant	  conception	  of	  liability	  can	  enable	  reductivists	  to	  draw	  the	  
desired	  distinction	  between	   combatants	   and	  non-­‐combatants	   (Bazargan	  2013).	  A	  more	   radical	  
view	   accepts	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   dilemma,	   but	   denies	   that	   the	   correct	   resolution	   requires	  
rejecting	  reductivism.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  correct	  conclusion	  is	  simply	  that	  many	  non-­‐combatants	  
on	   the	   unjust	   side	   of	   a	   war	   are	   liable	   to	   defensive	   killing.	   The	   dilemma	   does	   not	   reveal	   that	  
reductivism	  is	  false,	  but	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐combatant	  immunity	  is	  (Frowe,	  2014:	  Chs.	  6-­‐8).	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4.	  Non-­‐Reductivist	  Alternatives	  
	  
The	  two	  objections	  surveyed	  above,	  though	  motivated	  by	  different	  concerns,	  
are	   united	   in	   denying	   that	   liability	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   permissible	  
intentional	   killing	   in	   war.	   Instead,	   the	   criticisms	   suggest	   an	   alternative,	   ‘non-­‐
reductivist’	   view	   of	   the	   morality	   of	   war.	   Non-­‐reductivism	   encompasses	   a	  
spectrum	  of	  possible	  positions,	  but	  the	  unifying	  idea	  is	  that	  warfare	  differs	  from	  
standard	   cases	   of	   interpersonal	   violence	   in	   some	  morally	   relevant	   respect,	   so	  
that	  our	  conclusions	  about	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	  in	  the	  latter	  cases	  cannot	  
be	   straightforwardly	   imported	   into	   the	   former.	   Michael	   Walzer	   captures	   the	  
spirit	  of	  this	  view	  nicely	  in	  his	  pithy	  objection	  to	  McMahan’s	  reductivism:	  “What	  
Jeff	   McMahan	   provides	   is	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	   how	   killing	   in	   war	   would	   be	  
permissible	  if	  war	  were	  a	  peacetime	  activity.”	  (Walzer	  2006b:	  43)	  
While	  many	  are	  attracted	  to	  a	  non-­‐reductivist	  view	  –	  indeed,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  
that	  this	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	  position	  in	  the	  just	  war	  tradition11	  –	  the	  crucial	  
task	   for	   non-­‐reductivists	   is	   to	   identify	   a	   relevant	   differentiating	   feature	   of	  
warfare	   that	   is	   both	   morally	   significant	   and	   supportive	   of	   a	   more	   permissive	  
account	  of	  killing	  in	  war.	  	  
One	   prominent	   version	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   locates	   the	   relevant	   moral	  
difference	   in	   war’s	   collective	   and	   political	   character.	   They	   point	   out	   that	   war	  
does	  not	   simply	   involve	  otherwise-­‐unconnected	  private	   individuals	  using	   force	  
against	  one	  another,	  as	  in	  the	  simplified	  self-­‐defence	  cases	  that	  reductivists	  often	  
draw	  upon.	   Rather,	  war	   involves	   the	   use	   of	   force	   by	   groups	   or	   associations	   of	  
individuals	  engaged	   in	  morally	  significant	  relationships	  with	  one	  another.	  War,	  
on	  this	  view,	  is	  essentially	  an	  activity	  that	  people	  do	  together.12	  Reductivists,	  it	  is	  
charged,	  are	  blinded	  to	  this	  important	  feature	  of	  war	  by	  focussing	  on	  individual	  
self-­‐defence.	   In	   this	   section	   I	   outline	   the	   two	  most	   developed	   versions	   of	   non-­‐
reductivism,	  defended	  by	  Christopher	  Kutz	  and	  Seth	  Lazar,	  respectively.	  
	  
4.1	  The	  Collectivist	  View	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  For	   support	   for	   this	   claim,	   see	   the	   references	  contained	   in	   Jonathan	  Parry,	   ‘Just	  War	  Theory,	  
Legitimate	  Authority,	  and	  Irregular	  Belligerency’,	  Philosophia	  (forthcoming).	  
12	  For	  examples,	  see	  Fletcher	  (2002);	  Kutz	  (2005);	  Lazar	  (2012);	  Lazar	  (2013);	  Meisels	  (2012),	  
Sparrow	  (2005);	  Zohar	  (1993).	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The	  emphasis	  on	   collectives	   rather	   than	   individuals	   continues	   a	   tradition	  of	  
thinking	  about	  war	  with	  origins	  in	  Rousseau’s	  conception	  of	  political	  community	  
and	   war.	   On	   Rousseau’s	   view,	   a	   legitimate	   polity	   is	   constituted	   by	   an	   internal	  
relation	  of	  its	  citizens’	  wills.	  When	  the	  polity	  acts,	  through	  the	  coordinated	  action	  
of	   its	   citizens	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   general	   will,	   this	   collective	   action	   has	   a	  
normative	  personality	  over	  and	  above	  the	  sum	  of	  its	  component	  actions.	  War	  is	  a	  
paradigmatic	   example	   of	   this	   form	   of	   action.	   It	   is	   this	   internal	   relation	   of	  wills	  
which	  distinguishes	  war	  from	  merely	  private	  violence	  such	  as	  duels,	  riots,	  feuds	  
and	   brigandry.	  War,	   properly	   understood,	   is	   an	   activity	   that	   individuals	   simply	  
cannot	  perform,	   “War…is	  not	  a	   relationship	  between	  one	  man	  and	  another,	  but	  
between	  one	  State	  and	  another.”	  (Rousseau	  2012:	  169)	  
Christopher	  Kutz	   has	   developed	   a	   version	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	  based	   on	   this	  
collectivist	   understanding	   of	   war,	   which	   aims	   to	   defend	   a	   more	   orthodox	  
conception	  of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	  bello,	  which	   grants	   a	  permission	   to	   kill	   to	  
combatants	  who	  participate	  in	  both	  just	  and	  unjust	  wars	  (Kutz	  2005).	  	  For	  Kutz,	  
the	   norms	   governing	   conduct	   in	   war	   must	   reflect	   the	   fact	   that	   when	   soldiers	  
confront	  each	  other	  on	  the	  battlefield	  they	  do	  so	  not	  merely	  as	  private	  individuals,	  
but	   as	   citizen-­‐representatives	   of	   their	   communities	   engaging	   in	   collective	  
political	   action.	   On	   this	   view,	   the	   permission	   to	   kill	   in	   war	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	  
collective	  and	  political	  character	  of	  the	  activity	  and	  not,	  as	  reductivists	  argue,	  in	  
the	  liability	  of	  combatants	  qua	  individuals.	  Combatants	  in	  war	  possess	  what	  Kutz	  
terms	  an	  “essentially	  political	  permission”	  to	  harm	  their	  opponents	  (Kutz	  2005:	  
153).	  
This	  collectivist	  strategy	  allows	  Kutz	  to	  reassert	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  permission	  
to	  kill	   in	  war	  can	  apply	   independently	  of	   the	  overall	   just	  of	   the	  war	   itself.	  Since	  
combatants	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  conflict	   fight	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  political	  collective	  
and	  this	  fact	  obtains	  independently	  of	  the	  justice	  of	  their	  cause,	  each	  possesses	  a	  
permission	  to	  fight	  and	  kill	  in	  an	  unjust	  war,	  even	  though	  such	  actions	  would	  be	  
“infamous	   crimes”	   if	   committed	   privately	   (Kutz	   2005:	   153).	   On	   this	   view,	   the	  
conflict	   that	   reductivists	   identify	   between	   an	   orthodox	   view	   of	   just	   conduct	   in	  
war	  and	  considerations	  of	  individual	  liability	  can	  be	  explained	  away	  as	  resting	  on	  
an	  under-­‐appreciation	  of	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  collective	  political	  action.	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It	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  although	  Kutz’s	  collectivism	  is	  primarily	  intended	  
to	   provide	   a	   justification	   for	   one	   specific	   class	   of	   intentional	   killing	   in	  war	   not	  
justified	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   liability	   –	   the	   killing	   of	   just	   combatants	   by	   unjust	  
combatants	  –	   it	  also	  provides	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  defence	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  more	  
generally.	  If,	  as	  Lazar	  claims,	  participation	  in	  both	  unjust	  and	   just	  wars	  involves	  
the	   widespread	   intentional	   killing	   of	   non-­‐liable	   combatants,	   the	   collectivist	  
permission	  to	  kill	  can	  also	  be	  invoked	  to	  cover	  the	  latter	  class	  of	  cases	  as	  well.	  
Reductivists	   are,	   naturally,	   rather	   suspicious	   of	   this	   line	   of	   argument.	   For	  
McMahan,	  it	  trades	  on	  “a	  form	  of	  moral	  alchemy”	  (McMahan	  2007a:	  53)	  For	  how	  
can	   it	   be,	   he	   argues,	   that	   simply	   by	   forming	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   bond	   among	  
themselves	  and	  together	  pursuing	  certain	  kinds	  of	  political	  goals,	   that	  members	  
of	  a	  community	  can	  exempt	  themselves	   from	  the	  duties	  which	  would	  otherwise	  
be	  imposed	  by	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  non-­‐members?	  	  
However,	  non-­‐reductivists	  need	  not	  be	   committed	   to	  view	  as	   strong	  as	   this.	  
The	  most	  plausible	  versions	  of	  non-­‐reductivism	  will	  accept	  the	  reductivist	  insight	  
that	   fighting	   in	   an	   unjust	  war	   involves	   violating	   the	   rights	   of	   one’s	   opponents.	  
Instead,	   they	   will	   seek	   to	   show	   that	   the	   collective	   character	   of	   warfare	   is	  
sufficiently	   morally	   important	   to	   support	   a	   norm	   permitting	   the	   intentional	  
killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  breach	  of	  duty	  that	  this	  involves.	  In	  
fact,	   Kutz	   quite	   clearly	   indicates	   that	   his	   collectivist	   view	   is	   restricted	   in	   this	  
manner,	  acknowledging	  that	  “the	  unjust	  combatant	  morally	  wrongs	  those	  who	  he	  
kills.”(Kutz	  2005:	  173)	  
There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   non-­‐reductivist	   approach	   may	   be	  
formulated	   so	   as	   to	  meet	   this	   adequacy	   condition.	   The	   first	   is	   by	   limiting	   it	   to	  
offering	  a	  principled	  (rather	  than	  pragmatic	  or	  broadly	  consequentialist)	  defence	  
of	   the	   legal	   norms	   governing	   conduct	   in	  war.	   In	   particular,	   the	   immunity	   from	  
sanction	   that	   the	   law	   grants	   to	   combatants	   who	   kill	   in	   unjust	   wars.	   If	   the	  
collectivist	   notion	  of	   a	   ‘political	   permission’	   to	   kill	   is	   interpreted	   as	   justifying	   a	  
special	  type	  of	  legal	  defence,	  grounded	  in	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  collective	  
political	  action,	  then	  the	  legal	  permission	  to	  kill	   in	  unjust	  wars	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  
have	  deeper	  foundations	  than	  reductivists’	  claim,	  without	  having	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  
existence	  of	  special	  relationships	  among	  group	  members	  can	  render	  permissible	  
otherwise	  wrongful	  conduct.	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One	  way	  of	  making	  this	  argument,	  which	  Kutz	  suggests	  in	  several	  passages,	  is	  
to	   understand	   the	   normative	   significance	   of	   collective	   political	   action	   as	   taking	  
place	  at	   the	   level	  of	  how	  acts	  committed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  collective	  political	  activity	  
are	   attributable	   to	   specific	   individual	   agents	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   determining	  
their	   liability	   to	   blame	   and	   sanction.	   The	   thought	   is	   that	   agents	   who	   inflict	  
wrongs	   as	   participants	   in	   a	   collective	   political	   project,	   as	   opposed	   to	   private	  
wrongdoers,	  bear	  a	  different	  normative	  relationship	  to	  those	  acts,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	   renders	   the	   usual	   attribution	   of	   responsibility	   for	   specific	   wrongs	   to	  
particular	  agents	  inappropriate	  (Kutz	  2005:	  179).	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  wrongs	  may	  
be	   attributable	   to	   the	   collective	   as	   a	   whole,	   and	   perhaps	   derivatively	   to	   its	  
members	   qua	   members,	   but	   not	   to	   individual	   combatants	   qua	   private	  
individuals.13	  On	   this	   view,	   the	   fact	   that	   agents	  do	  wrong	  as	  part	  of	   a	   collective	  
political	  activity	  provides	  an	   important	  exculpatory	  consideration,	   justifying	  the	  
legal	  practice	  of	  not	  criminalising	  the	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  in	  war.	  
	  
4.2	  The	  Associative	  Duty	  View	  
	  
A	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  may	  also	  be	  refined	  in	  a	  second	  direction,	  which	  aims	  to	  
preserve	  the	  stronger	  claim	  that	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  warfare	  is	  able	  to	  render	  
it	   morally	   permissible	   for	   combatants	   to	   intentionally	   kill	   their	   non-­‐liable	  
opponents.	   This	   view	   accepts	   that	   such	   killing	   involves	   a	   serious	   injustice,	   but	  
denies	  that	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  render	  it	  impermissible.	  On	  one	  way	  of	  arguing	  for	  
this	   position,	   the	   duty	   not	   to	   intentionally	   kill	   the	   non-­‐liable,	   while	   certainly	  
stringent,	  may	   be	   overridden	   by	  weightier	  moral	   considerations,	   rendering	   the	  
rights	  transgression	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  justified.	  	  
In	   a	   recent	   article,	   Lazar	   argues	   that	   certain	   features	   of	   collectives	   can	  
generate	   these	   weighty	   reasons	   (Lazar	   2013).	   More	   specifically,	   such	   reasons	  
arise	  from	  the	  value	  of	  a	  range	  of	  significant	  relationships	  that	  combatants	  share	  
with	   many	   of	   their	   fellow	   group	   members,	   such	   as	   those	   that	   obtain	   between	  
family	   members,	   loved	   ones,	   friends,	   colleagues,	   comrades-­‐in-­‐arms	   and	   co-­‐
citizens.	   Lazar	   emphasises	   that	   participants	   in	   these	   relationships	   incur	  
extremely	  stringent	  moral	  duties	  to	  protect	  their	  associates	  from	  harm.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  Lichtenberg	  (2008).	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Crucially,	  for	  Lazar,	  these	  associative	  duties	  to	  protect	  may	  be	  weightier	  than	  
the	  negative	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  non-­‐liable,	  such	  that	  when	  these	  duties	  come	  
into	  conflict,	  harming	  the	  non-­‐liable	  may	  be	  justified	  as	  the	  lesser	  breach	  of	  duty.	  
Lazar’s	   argument	   for	   this	   conclusion	   is	   sophisticated	   and	   lengthy,	   but	   the	  
underlying	   thought	   appeals	   to	   our	   intuitions	   about	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   duty	   to	  
protect	  appears	   to	   trump	  the	  duty	  not	   to	  kill	   the	  non-­‐liable.14	  For	  example,	   in	  a	  
scenario	   in	  which	  a	  parent	   is	  able	  to	  divert	  a	   falling	  boulder	  that	  will	  otherwise	  
crush	  her	  child	  onto	  a	  non-­‐liable	  bystander,	  many	  find	  it	  intuitive	  that	  the	  parent	  
would	   be	   justified	   in	   doing	   so,	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   special	   relationship	  with	   their	  
child.	   Extrapolating	   from	   such	   cases,	   Lazar	   argues	   that	   killing	   non-­‐liable	  
combatants	   in	  war	  can	  be	   justified	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	   since	  such	  killing	  may	  be	  
necessary	  to	  protect	  one’s	  associates	  from	  serious	  harm.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  	  
	  
sometimes	  we	  can	  protect	  our	  associates	  only	  if	  we	  fight	  and	  kill.	  We	  have	  duties	  
to	  protect	  our	  associates,	  grounded	  in	  the	  value	  of	  these	  special	  relationships.	  Our	  
armed	  forces	  are	  the	  executors	  of	  those	  duties.	  When	  they	  fight,	  those	  duties	  may	  
clash	  with	   the	   rights	   that	   they	  must	   violate	   to	  win	   the	  war.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	  
associative	  duty	  to	  protect	  can	  override	  those	  rights,	  thus	  rendering	  some	  acts	  of	  
killing	  all	  things	  considered	  justified.	  (Lazar	  2013:	  9)	  
	  
The	  associative-­‐duty	  view	  is	  primarily	  intended	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  how	  
intentional	   killing	   in	   just	   wars	   can	   be	   morally	   permissible,	   since,	   for	   Lazar,	   it	  
cannot	   be	   justified	   in	   terms	   of	   liability.	   However,	   as	   Lazar	   recognises,	   it	   also	  
makes	  possible	  a	  qualified	  defence	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  participating	  in	  unjust	  
wars,	   since	   fighting	   and	   killing	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   protect	   one’s	   associates	  
independently	  of	  whether	  one’s	  war	  is	  overall	  justified	  (Lazar	  2013:	  45-­‐46).	  
The	   two	   versions	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   outlined	   above	   can	   be	   contrasted	   in	  
terms	   of	   the	   precise	   challenge	   that	   each	   poses	   to	   reductivism.	   The	   collectivist	  
view	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  denying	  the	  Continuity	  Thesis.	  On	  this	  view,	  war,	  as	  a	  
manifestation	   of	   collective	   political	   agency,	   is	  morally	   sui	  generis.	   It	   is	   simply	   a	  
mistake	   to	   treat	  warfare	   as	   an	   aggregation	  of	   interactions	  between	   individuals.	  
The	  associative-­‐duty	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   is	  compatible	  with	   the	  Continuity	  
Thesis,	   since	   duties	   to	   one’s	   associates	   are	   a	   regular	   feature	   of	   ordinary	  
interpersonal	   morality.	   Instead,	   it	   denies	   the	   reductivist	   Content	   Thesis,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Lazar	  supports	  his	  view	  with	  an	  argument	  from	  transitivity	  (Lazar	  2013:	  19-­‐30)	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holds	   that	   interpersonal	  morality	   includes	   an	   additional	   and	   underappreciated	  
class	   of	   justification	   for	   intentional	   killing,	   grounded	   in	   the	   stringency	   of	   these	  
duties.	  	  
	  
4.	  The	  War	  Crimes	  Objection	  
	  
In	  what	  follows,	  I	  argue	  that	  non-­‐reductivism	  should	  be	  rejected.	  By	  its	  own	  
lights	   and	   granting	   its	   major	   assumptions	   about	   the	   moral	   significance	   of	  
collectives	  or	  associative	  relationships,	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  approach	  fails	  to	  provide	  
an	   acceptable	   account	   of	   permissible	   conduct	   in	   war.	   In	   particular,	   it	   cannot	  
provide	   a	   convincing	   account	   of	   the	   fundamental	   idea	   that	   certain	   classes	   of	  
person	   are	   morally	   immune	   from	   attack	   in	   war.	   The	   objection	   is	   intended	   to	  
apply,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	   to	   each	   of	   the	   variants	   of	   non-­‐reductivism	   canvassed	  
above.	  
As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   debate	   between	   reductivists	   and	   their	   opponents	  
centres	  on	  the	  justification	  of	   intentionally	  killing	  combatants	   in	  war.	  However,	  
of	  course,	  the	  norms	  of	  conduct	  in	  war	  are	  far	  from	  exhausted	  by	  permissions	  to	  
kill.	   The	  majority	   of	   these	   rules	   are	   prohibitive	   in	   character,	  most	   notably	   the	  
requirement	   of	   discrimination,	   which	   prohibits	   attacks	   on	   certain	   classes	   of	  
person	  in	  war.	  To	  paraphrase	  Michael	  Walzer,	  the	  hard	  part	  in	  thinking	  ethically	  
about	   war	   is	   not	   to	   explain	   why	   certain	   people	   cannot	   be	   deliberately	   killed.	  
Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  explain	  how	  anyone	  can	  be	  (Walzer	  2006:	  41).	  	  
Despite	  the	  consensus	  that	  attacks	  on	  certain	  persons	  are	  prohibited	  in	  war,	  
there	   is	   considerable	   debate	   among	   just	   war	   theorists	   as	   to	   precisely	   which	  
persons	   qualify.	   While	   virtually	   all	   accounts	   of	   discrimination	   start	   from	   the	  
truism	  that	  clearly	  innocent	  people	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  deliberately	  targeted,	  there	  is	  
dispute	   as	   to	   how	   the	   notion	   of	   innocence	   is	   to	   be	   understood	   and,	   most	  
importantly,	   how	   it	   can	   be	   lost.	   Disagreements	   about	   these	   two	   issues	   yield	  
significant	   differences	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   the	   distinction	   between	   legitimate	   and	  
illegitimate	   targets	   is	   drawn.	   But	   in	   cases	   where	   innocence	   is	   clear	   and	  
uncontroversial,	  such	  as	  young	  children,	  there	  is	  broad	  agreement	  that	  targeting	  
these	   individuals	   is	   prohibited	   (or	   at	   least	   subject	   to	   an	   extremely	   weighty	  
constraint),	   and	   that	   the	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   these	   individuals	   have	   done	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nothing	   to	   lose	   their	   normal	   right	   against	   being	   attacked.	   Disputes	   arise	   from	  
competing	  conceptions	  of	   innocence	  and	   liability,	  not	   from	  disagreement	  about	  
the	  significance	  of	  these	  concepts	  for	  determining	  prohibitions	  on	  targeting.	  
We	   may	   term	   this	   straightforward	   approach	   to	   discrimination	   a	   target-­‐
centred	   account:	   It	   explains	   why	   attacks	   on	   certain	   persons	   are	   prohibited	   or	  
permitted	   by	   reference	   to	   certain	   facts	   about	   those	   persons.	   This	   account	   also	  
underpins	  a	  commonsense	  understanding	  of	  why	  certain	  acts	  in	  war,	  such	  as	  the	  
deliberate	   killing	   of	   non-­‐combatants,	   are	   appropriately	   criminalised	   as	   war	  
crimes.	   The	   offence	   of	   the	  war	   crime	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   grave	   rights	   violation	  
suffered	  by	  the	  victim.	  
However,	   this	   straightforward	   and	   highly	   intuitive	   explanation	   of	   the	  
restrictions	  on	  intentional	  killing	  in	  war	  is	  not	  available	  to	  non-­‐reductivists.	  On	  
the	   non-­‐reductivist	   views	   considered	   earlier,	   the	   permissibility	   (or	   non-­‐
criminality)	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  –	  the	  killing	  of	  combatants	  by	  other	  
combatants	  –	  is	  grounded	  not	  in	  the	  non-­‐innocence	  or	  liability	  of	  the	  combatants	  
who	  are	  harmed,	  but	  in	  certain	  facts	  about	  the	  combatants	  who	  inflict	  the	  harms.	  
On	  Kutz’s	   view,	   it	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   combatants	   act	   as	   agents	   of	   their	   collectives	  
which	   explains	   their	   permission	   to	   kill	   opposing	   combatants.	   For	   Lazar,	   it	   is	  
combatants’	  associative	  duties	  which	  do	  the	  normative	  heavy-­‐lifting.	  	  
Since	   it	   is	   this	   fact	   about	   those	   who	   inflict	   harm	   in	   war,	   rather	   than	   facts	  
about	   those	   who	   suffer	   harm,	   which	   determine	   whether	   such	   harming	   is	  
permissible,	  we	  may	   characterise	  non-­‐reductivists	   as	   offering	   an	  agent-­‐centred	  
account	  of	  permissible	  killing	  in	  war.	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  liability	  of	  
the	  target	  of	  harm	  does	  not	  play	  the	  same	  decisive	  role	  in	  determining	  whether	  
inflicting	   that	   harm	   is	   permissible	   that	   it	   does	   on	   the	   standard,	   target-­‐centred	  
account.15	  
As	   explained	   above,	   the	   attractiveness	   of	   an	   agent-­‐centred	   view	   is	   clear.	   It	  
makes	  possible	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  killing	  in	  war	  without	  having	  to	  
argue	  that	  such	  action	  can	  be	  permitted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  target-­‐centred,	  liability-­‐
based	   justifications.	  However,	   the	  major	  difficulty	   facing	  an	  agent-­‐centred	  view	  
is	   that	   if	   it	   succeeds	   in	  supporting	   the	  permission	  kill	  non-­‐liable	  combatants,	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  I	   borrow	   the	   terms	   ‘target-­‐centred’	   and	   ‘agent-­‐centred’	   from	   McMahan	   (1994:	   268),	   who	  
employs	  them	  to	  distinguish	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defence.	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seems	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  restrictions	  on	  who	  may	  be	  
targeted	   in	   war.16	  For	   if	   the	   permission	   enjoyed	   by	   combatants	   to	   kill	   their	  
opponents,	  who	  (by	  hypothesis)	  have	  done	  nothing	  to	  lose	  their	  normal	  right	  not	  
to	  be	  killed,	  rests	  on	  certain	  facts	  about	  the	  combatants	  carrying	  out	  the	  killing,	  
then	  there	  seems	  no	  reason	  why	  targeting	  and	  killing	  other	  non-­‐liable	  persons	  in	  
war,	   such	   as	  non-­‐combatants,	   is	   not	   also	   rendered	  permissible	   in	   virtue	  of	   the	  
very	  same	  facts.	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  examples:	  
	  
Siege	  1:	  Nation	  A,	   a	   fully-­‐functioning	  political	   community,	  wages	  an	  unjust	  war	  
against	  Nation	  B	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  annexing	  an	  area	  of	  Nation	  B’s	  territory.	  Nation	  B	  
militarily	  opposes	  the	   invasion	  and	  a	  conventional	  war	  ensues,	  endangering	  the	  
lives	  of	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  on	  both	  sides.	  At	  a	  pivotal	  stage	   in	  the	  
war	  Nation	  A	  has	  one	  of	  Nation	  B’s	  strategically	  vital	  cities	  surrounded.	  In	  order	  
to	  win	  the	  war	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  the	  city	  be	  taken.	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  can	  only	  do	  
so	   by	   bombarding	   the	   city’s	   armed	   defenders,	   killing	   10,000	   of	   Nation	   B’s	  
combatants.	  	  
	  
Siege	  2:	  The	  circumstances	  are	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  Siege	  1,	  except	  that	  Nation	  A	  
does	  not	  have	  the	  option	  of	  attacking	  the	  city’s	  armed	  defenders.	  Instead,	  Nation	  
A’s	   combatants	   can	   only	   take	   the	   city	   by	   bombarding	   its	   residential	   areas,	  
intentionally	  killing	  3,000	  of	  Nation	  B’s	  non-­‐combatants.	  
	  
According	   to	  both	   the	   law	  of	  war	  and	  orthodox	   just	  war	   theory,	  combatants	  
who	  engage	  in	  Siege	  1	  would	  not	  act	  impermissibly	  nor	  be	  legitimately	  punished	  
for	   doing	   so,	   since	   their	   actions	   respect	   the	   principle	   of	   discrimination	   as	  
standardly	  interpreted.	  Combatants	  who	  engage	  in	  Siege	  2,	  by	  contrast,	  would	  be	  
judged	   to	   act	   impermissibly.	   They	   clearly	   violate	   any	   plausible	   requirement	   of	  
discrimination	   and	   may	   appropriately	   be	   held	   liable	   to	   prosecution	   for	   war	  
crimes.	  I	  take	  it	  as	  uncontroversial	  that	  any	  adequate	  theory	  of	  the	  ethics	  of	  war	  
must	  judge	  participation	  in	  Siege	  2	  to	  be	  straightforwardly	  impermissible.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  McMahan	  briefly	  raises	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  objection	  of	  this	  sort,	  but	  does	  not	  pursue	  it	  at	  any	  
length	  (McMahan	  2007b:	  313).	  He	  also	  suggests	  an	  analogous	  line	  of	  objection	  to	  agent-­‐centred	  
accounts	  of	  self-­‐defence	  (McMahan	  1994:	  270-­‐271).	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The	  problem	  non-­‐reductivists	   face	   is	   that	  by	  explaining	  why	  participation	   in	  
cases	  like	  Siege	  1	  can	  be	  permissible	  in	  terms	  of	  facts	  about	  the	  combatants	  who	  
participate,	  they	  seem	  unable	  to	  account	  for	  the	  impermissibility	  of	  participation	  
in	   cases	   like	   Siege	   2.	   All	   the	   relevant	   agent-­‐centred	   facts	   that	   non-­‐reductivists	  
may	  cite	  as	  grounding	  the	  permission	  to	   intentionally	  kill	  non-­‐liable	   individuals	  
in	  Siege	  1	  also	  obtain	  in	  Siege	  2.	  In	  each	  case,	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  will	  be	  acting	  
as	  participants	  in	  a	  collective	  political	  project,	  and	  in	  each	  case	  participation	  is	  a	  
necessary	  means	  for	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  to	  discharge	  their	  associative	  duties	  
to	  protect.	  Nothing	   in	   these	   agent-­‐centred	   considerations	  provides	   a	  means	   for	  
morally	   distinguishing	   between	   targeting	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   and	   non-­‐liable	  
non-­‐combatants.	   If	   these	   considerations	   are	   capable	   of	  making	   participation	   in	  
Siege	   1	   permissible,	   they	   should	   do	   the	   same	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Siege	   2.	   In	   fact,	  
participating	  in	  Siege	  2	  should	  be	  morally	  preferable,	  since	  it	  involves	  significantly	  
less	  killing	  of	  non-­‐liable	  persons	  than	  Siege	  1.	  	  
So,	   while	   often	   invoked	   in	   defence	   of	   certain	   central	   intuitions	   about	   just	  
conduct	   in	   war,	   a	   non-­‐reductivist	   approach	   in	   fact	   seems	   to	   have	   deeply	  
revisionary	  implications	  of	   its	  own	  that	  warrant	  rejecting	  the	  view.	  If	  successful	  
in	  providing	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  permission	  to	  kill	  combatants	  in	  war,	  the	  view	  lacks	  
the	  resources	   to	  explain	   the	  most	   intuitive	  restrictions	  on	  killing.	  Term	  this	   the	  
‘war-­‐crimes	  objection’	  to	  non-­‐reductivism.	  The	  problem	  flows	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  
prohibitions	  on	  targeting	  are	  most	  easily	  and	  naturally	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
non-­‐liability	  of	  the	  target	  of	  harm.	  Yet	  non-­‐reductivists	  are	  committed	  to	  denying	  
this	   idea.	  The	  objection	   is	  particularly	   troublesome	   for	  non-­‐reductivists	   such	  as	  
Lazar,	   who	   reject	   reductivism	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	   cannot	   justify	   warfare	  
without	  also	  jettisoning	  the	  idea	  of	  non-­‐combatant	  immunity.	  
	  
5.	  Alternative	  Groundings	  for	  Constraints	  on	  Targeting	  
	  
What	   the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  highlights	   is	   that	   the	  acceptability	  of	   a	  non-­‐
reductivist	  approach	  rests	  not	  only	  on	  whether	  it	  can	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  the	  
permission	  to	  kill	  in	  war,	  but	  also,	  more	  importantly,	  on	  whether	  it	  can	  provide	  a	  
similarly	   non-­‐reductive	   account	   of	   the	   most	   intuitive	   in	   bello	   restrictions.	   To	  
avoid	   the	   objection,	   a	   plausible	   distinction	   between	   legitimate	   and	   illegitimate	  
	   16	  
targeting	  in	  war	  needs	  to	  be	  drawn	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  facts	  that	  non-­‐reductivists	  can	  
accept	  as	  decisive	   for	  determining	   the	  permissibility	  of	   intentional	  killing.	  This	  
requires	  a	  revisionary	  account	  of	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐
combatants,	  which	  appeals	  to	  considerations	  other	  than	  non-­‐liability.	  
To	   be	   successful,	   such	   an	   account	   must	   meet	   two	   requirements.	   Firstly,	   it	  
must	   identify	   some	   additional	   consideration	   –	   either	   target-­‐centred	   or	   agent-­‐
centred	  –	  that	  grounds	  a	  genuine	  moral	  constraint	  on	  harming.	  Secondly,	  it	  must	  
then	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  the	  desired	  distinction	  between	  legitimate	  and	  illegitimate	  
targets	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  consideration.	  This	  section	  considers	  several	  possible	  
responses	  of	  this	  type	  and	  argues	  they	  fail	  to	  provide	  a	  successful	  account	  of	  the	  
prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  
	  
5.1	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  I:	  Role-­‐based	  obligations	  
	  
One	  plausible	  agent-­‐centred	  candidate	  for	  grounding	  the	  prohibition	  appeals	  
to	  a	  professional	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  on	  the	  part	  of	  combatants	  to	  refrain	  from	  
targeting	   non-­‐combatants. 17 	  Members	   of	   many	   professions	   are	   considered	  
subject	  to	  stringent	  constraints	  on	  their	  behaviour	  as	  a	  result	  of	  taking	  up	  their	  
role.	  The	  military	  profession	  may	  be	   considered	  a	  paradigmatic	   source	  of	   such	  
obligations.	   Coupled	  with	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐
combatants	   is	   a	   central	   role-­‐based	   obligation	   for	   military	   professionals,	   a	  
response	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	   objection	   becomes	   available.	   The	   non-­‐reductivist	  
permission	   to	   target	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	   does	   not	   also	   extend	   to	   targeting	  
non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants,	   because	   it	   is	   constrained	   by	   soldiers’	   stringent	  
professional	  obligations	  to	  refrain	  from	  the	  latter	  but	  not	  the	  former.	  	  
However,	  this	  response	  is	  susceptible	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  related	  objections.	  The	  first	  
is	   that	   it	   makes	   the	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants	   contingent	   on	  
whether	   the	  military	   organisation	   in	   question	   actually	   endorses	   a	   professional	  
code	  that	  prohibits	  such	  action.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  a	  society	  that	  endorses	  an	  
alternative	  (but	  not	  wildly	  implausible)	  professional	  military	  ethic	  that	  does	  not	  
include	  a	  strict	  prohibition	  on	   targeting	  non-­‐combatants.	   Instead,	   it	  endorses	  a	  
professional	   code	   which	   requires	   that	   targeting	   decisions	   be	   made	   so	   as	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Thanks	  to	  Jeff	  McMahan	  for	  suggesting	  this	  line	  of	  response.	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minimise	   the	   overall	   number	   of	   non-­‐liable	   people	   who	   are	   harmed.	   The	   role-­‐
based	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection	  seems	  committed	  to	  accepting	  that	  
members	   of	   such	   a	   military	   organisation	   would	   not	   possess	   an	   additional	  
obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants.	  More	  strongly,	  in	  
a	  choice	  between	  participating	   in	  Siege	  1	  or	  Siege	  2,	   they	  would	  be	  required	   to	  
choose	   the	   latter.	   But	   this	   is	   deeply	   unpalatable.	   Few,	   I	   take	   it,	  would	  want	   to	  
defend	   the	   view	   that	   it	   is	   impermissible	   for	   soldiers	   to	   target	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐
combatants	  because	  they	   just	  happen	  to	  be	  members	  of	  an	  organisation	  whose	  
conventions	  forbid	  it.18	  
If	  this	  implication	  is	  to	  be	  avoided,	  the	  role-­‐based	  obligation	  to	  refrain	  from	  
attacks	   on	   non-­‐combatants	   needs	   to	   be	   grounded	   in	   some	   relevant	   moral	  
constraint	   that	   is	   not	   itself	   conventional.	   However,	   while	   this	   move	   may	   help	  
alleviate	  the	  charge	  of	  contingency,	   it	  does	  so	  at	   the	  cost	  of	  a	  second	  objection,	  
which	  is	  that	  the	  appeal	  to	  role	  obligations	  becomes	  redundant.	  For	  now,	  on	  this	  
revised	   view,	   the	   actual	   source	   of	   the	   obligation	   not	   to	   target	   non-­‐combatants	  
lies	  in	  a	  moral	  constraint	  that	  is	  external	  to	  the	  professional	  role.	  The	  role	  itself	  
no	  longer	  does	  any	  independent	  moral	  work.19	  The	  deeper	  problem	  highlighted	  
by	  this	  redundancy	  arises	  when	  we	  consider	  what	  external	  considerations	  could	  
be	   capable	   of	   explaining	   the	   prohibition	   on	   participation	   in	   cases	   like	   Siege	  2.	  
One	  candidate	  seems	  obvious:	  The	   target-­‐centred	   fact	   that	   the	  non-­‐combatants	  
are	   not	   liable	   to	   attack.	   But,	   as	   explained	   above,	   non-­‐reductivists	   are	   excluded	  
from	   this	   intuitive	   explanation.	   The	   role-­‐based	   response	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	  
objection	  is	  then,	  at	  best,	  unsatisfactorily	  contingent,	  or,	  at	  worst,	  no	  response	  at	  
all.	  	  
	  
5.2	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  agent-­‐centred	  facts	  II:	  The	  avoidance	  of	  cowardice	  
	  
Lazar	   suggests	   an	   alternative	   agent-­‐centred	   constraint	   on	   targeting	   non-­‐
combatants,	  which	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  the	  charge	  of	  contingency.	  On	  this	  view,	  
the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  
action	   manifests	   the	   vice	   of	   cowardice,	   whereas	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  A	  related	  contingency	  problem	  for	  proposal	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  apply	  to	  belligerent	  
parties	  who	  are	  not	  a	  professional	  military,	  such	  as	  a	  disorganised	  militia	  or	  levee	  en	  masse.	  
19	  On	  this	  point	  more	  generally,	  see	  Simmons	  (1996).	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combatants	  does	  not.	  It	  is	  the	  avoidance	  of	  this	  vice	  which	  imposes	  the	  additional	  
moral	  constraint	  required	  to	  avoid	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  objection	  (Lazar	  2013:	  39).	  
There	   are,	   however,	   three	   problems	  with	   this	   response.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   it	  
seems	  to	  get	  the	  order	  of	  explanation	  backwards.	  It	  seems	  much	  more	  natural	  to	  
say	   that	   actions	   are	   cowardly	   because	   they	   are	   wrong,	   rather	   than	   wrong	  
because	  cowardly.	  To	  accuse	  someone	  of	  cowardice	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  they	  failed	  to	  
respond	  appropriately	  to	  morally	  relevant	  features	  of	  their	  situation.	  It	  is	  not	  to	  
claim	  that	  they	  had	  an	  additional	  moral	  reason	  –	  avoiding	  cowardice	  –	  that	  they	  
failed	  to	  act	  on.	  So,	  rather	  than	  simply	  claiming	  that	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  is	  
cowardly,	   the	  response	  needs	  to	  give	  us	  an	  account	  of	   the	   features	  of	   targeting	  
non-­‐combatants	   that	   make	   them	   both	   cowardly	   and	   wrong.	   I	   consider	   an	  
obvious	  candidate	  in	  Section	  5.5	  below.	  
A	  second	  problem	  for	  the	  argument-­‐from-­‐cowardice	  lies	  in	  the	  inwardness	  of	  
the	  moral	  constraint	  to	  which	  it	  appeals.	  On	  this	  view,	  combatants	  ought	  not	  to	  
target	   non-­‐combatants	   because	   of	   the	   effect	   that	   this	   would	   have	   on	   the	  
combatants	  themselves.	  They	  would	  be	  cowards	  if	  they	  did	  so.	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  
acting	   in	  a	   certain	  way	  would	  be	  bad	   for	  the	  agent	   does	  not	  usually	   impose	  an	  
obligation	  on	  that	  agent	  to	  refrain	  from	  acting.	  Common-­‐sense	  morality	  permits	  
agents	  to	  make	  self-­‐sacrifices	  in	  pursuing	  their	  aims,	  provided	  those	  aims	  are	  not	  
morally	   prohibited	   on	   independent	   grounds.	   So,	   even	   if	   targeting	   non-­‐
combatants	   is	   cowardly	   and	   combatants	   incur	   a	   moral	   cost	   by	   doing	   so,	   this	  
should	  not	  morally	  prohibit	  the	  agent	  from	  acting.	  	  
Thirdly,	   if	   we	   grant	   that	   the	   avoidance	   of	   cowardice	   provides	   a	   weighty	  
reason	   for	   action	   (weighty	   enough	   to	   justify	   the	   killing	   of	   an	   additional	   7,000	  
non-­‐liable	   persons!),	   then	   we	   get	   some	   very	   counter-­‐intuitive	   results	   in	   other	  
cases.	  For	  example,	  the	  argument	  implies	  if	  a	  group	  of	  combatants	  have	  a	  choice	  
between	   attacking	   a	   small	   number	   of	   enemy	   combatants	   who	   they	   greatly	  
outnumber,	   or	   attacking	   a	   much	   greater	   number	   of	   combatants	   in	   order	   to	  
achieve	  the	  same	  military	  goal,	  they	  have	  a	  very	  strong	  cowardice-­‐based	  reason	  
to	  attack	  the	  larger	  number,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  more	  combatants	  will	  be	  
killed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  doing	  so.	  This	  seems	  highly	  implausible.20	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Thanks	  to	  Daniel	  Viehoff	  for	  this	  example.	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5.3	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  I:	  Modes	  of	  agency	  
	  
Appeals	   to	   additional	   agent-­‐centred	   considerations	   have	   proved	   insufficient	   to	  
ground	  the	  required	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants.	  A	  more	  promising	  
approach	  aims	  to	  ground	  the	  prohibition	  in	  the	  effect	  that	  such	  harming	  has	  on	  
its	  targets,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  basic	  rights	  transgression	  suffered.	  
One	   response	   of	   this	   type	   appeals	   to	   the	  moral	   distinction	   between	   acts	   of	  
intentional	   harming	   that	   are	  manipulative	   (that	   involve	   using	   their	   victim	   as	   a	  
means)	   and	   those	   that	   are	   eliminative	   (that	  merely	   remove	   a	   threat	   that	   their	  
victim	  poses	  or	  contributes	  to).	  Many	  believe	  that	  acts	  of	  manipulative	  harming	  
are	   subject	   to	   a	   higher	   justificatory	   burden	   than	   acts	   of	   eliminative	   harming,	  
since	   they	   involve	   a	   more	   objectionable	   mode	   of	   agency.	   Other	   things	   being	  
equal,	  one	  suffers	  a	  graver	  wrong	  if	  one	  is	  unjustly	  harmed	  manipulatively	  rather	  
than	  eliminatively.21	  
If	  we	  grant	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  eliminative	  and	  manipulative	  harm	  
has	   moral	   significance,	   a	   response	   to	   the	   war	   crimes	   objection	   becomes	  
available.	   One	   may	   argue	   that	   the	   agent-­‐centred	   facts	   that	   ground	   the	   non-­‐
reductive	   permission	   are	   sufficiently	   important	   to	   permit	   eliminatively	   killing	  
non-­‐liable	   persons,	   but	   not	   manipulatively.22	  Combined	   with	   the	   descriptive	  
claim	   that	   targeting	   non-­‐combatants	   in	  war	   functions	  manipulatively,	  whereas	  
killing	   combatants	   is	   merely	   eliminative,	   one	   can	   non-­‐arbitrarily	   restrict	   the	  
scope	  of	  the	  non-­‐reductive	  permission	  to	  the	  killing	  of	  combatants	  (Lazar	  2013:	  
39).	  
However,	   there	   are	   two	   problems	   with	   this	   response,	   which	   have	   been	  
recognised	   by	   non-­‐reductivists	   (Lazar	   2013:	   39).	   The	   first	   is	   that	   targeting	  
civilians	  will	  often	  function	  eliminatively.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  that	  the	  civilian	  
areas	  to	  be	  targeted	  in	  Siege	  2	  are	  populated	  by	  industrial	  workers,	  or	  even	  just	  
tax-­‐payers.	  Killing	  these	  non-­‐combatants	  would	  contribute	  to	  Nation	  A’s	  victory	  
by	   eliminating	   the	   contributions	   that	   they	   make	   to	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	  
enemy	  state,	   in	  broadly	   the	  same	  way	  that	  killing	  enemy	  combatants	  would	  do	  
so.	   Such	   cases	   show	   that	   the	   putative	   constraint	   imposed	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  For	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  Tadros	  (2011:	  Ch.6).	  
22	  Jonathan	   Quong	   employs	   an	   analogous	   argument	   in	   order	   to	   constrain	   his	   agent-­‐centred	  
account	  of	  permissible	  self-­‐defensive	  killing	  (Quong	  2009).	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eliminative/manipulative	   distinction	   would	   not	   rule	   out	   targeting	   non-­‐
combatants.23	  	  
Secondly,	   and	   conversely,	   targeting	   combatants	   may	   often	   function	  
manipulatively.	  The	  deaths	  of	  combatants	  may	  be	  intended	  to	  shock	  and	  coerce	  
their	   side’s	   political	   leaders	   or	   civilian	   population	   into	   ending	   the	   war,	   or	   to	  
persuade	   military	   commanders	   to	   surrender	   or	   adopt	   an	   alternative	   strategy	  
more	  amenable	  to	  the	  opposing	  party.	  Hence,	  the	  proposed	  constraint	  will	  often	  
prohibit	  the	  targeting	  of	  combatants.	  
	  
5.4	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  II:	  Risk	  
	  
A	  different	  target-­‐centred	  approach	  aims	  to	  locate	  a	  response	  to	  the	  war-­‐crimes	  
objection	   in	   the	   moral	   significance	   of	   the	   uncertainty	   and	   moral	   risk	   that	  
accompanies	  killing	  in	  war	  (Lazar	  2013:	  39).	  
On	   this	   view,	   intentionally	   killing	   a	   non-­‐liable	   person	   is	   certainly	   a	   grave	  
moral	  wrong,	  but	  the	  wrong	  is	  greater	  the	  higher	  the	  ex	  ante	  probability	  that	  that	  
individual	   targeted	   is	  non-­‐liable.	  Other	   things	  being	  equal,	   killing	  an	   individual	  
when	  one	  is	  certain	  that	  they	  are	  not	  liable	  constitutes	  a	  more	  serious	  disrespect	  
for	  their	  moral	  status	  than	  killing	  an	  individual	  when	  one	  is	  unsure	  of	  their	  non-­‐
liability.	  	  	  
Conjoining	  this	  idea	  with	  the	  descriptive	  claim	  that	  non-­‐combatants	  are	  much	  
more	   likely	   to	   be	   non-­‐liable	   than	   combatants	   generates	   a	   possible	   means	   of	  
generating	  the	  prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war.	  It	  may	  be	  argued	  
that	   the	   agent-­‐centred	   facts	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   non-­‐reductive	   permission	   are	  
sufficiently	   morally	   weighty	   to	   permit	   the	   killing	   of	   non-­‐liable	   combatants	  
(because	   the	   probability	   that	   such	   targets	   are	   non-­‐liable	   falls	   below	   some	  
threshold),	   but	   not	  weighty	   enough	   to	   render	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐
combatants	   permissible	   (because	   the	   probability	   of	   these	   targets	   being	   non-­‐
liable	  exceeds	  that	  threshold).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  This	   is	   a	   particular	   problem	   for	   non-­‐reductivists	   such	   as	   Lazar,	  who	   argue	   that	   reductivism	  
renders	   too	  many	   non-­‐combatants	   liable	   because	   non-­‐combatants	   contribute	   to	   threats	   to	   the	  
same	  degree	  as	  many	  combatants.	   If	   this	   is	   true,	   the	   intentional	  killing	  of	  many	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐
combatants	  will	  function	  eliminatively,	  by	  preventing	  them	  from	  contributing	  to	  threats.	  If	  this	  is	  
false,	  then	  reductivists	  may	  not	  face	  the	  dilemma	  that	  Lazar	  claims	  that	  they	  do.	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However,	  even	  granting	  the	  normative	  claim,	  this	  response	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  
provide	   the	   desired	   result	   in	   the	   Siege	   cases,	   in	   two	   respects.	   Firstly,	   the	  
descriptive	  claim	  that	  combatants	  “are	  undoubtedly	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  liable	  than	  
non-­‐combatants”	  (Lazar	  2013:	  39)	  is	  not	  true	  when	  the	  combatants	  in	  question	  
are	  participating	   in	  a	  war	   that	   is	   justified.	   In	   the	  Siege	   cases	  neither	  Nation	  B’s	  
combatants	  nor	  non-­‐combatants	  have	  done	  anything	  to	  render	  themselves	  liable	  
to	  harm.	  Hence,	  considerations	  of	  moral	  risk	  will	  not	  favour	  the	  targeting	  of	  one	  
of	  these	  sub-­‐populations	  over	  the	  other.	  
Secondly,	  when	  numbers	  are	  taken	  in	  consideration,	  the	  argument-­‐from-­‐risk	  
may	  not	  in	  fact	  weigh	  against	  the	  targeting	  of	  non-­‐combatants.	  To	  demonstrate,	  
consider	   a	   variation	   on	   the	   Siege	   cases,	   in	   which	   we	   grant	   that	   Nation	   B’s	  
combatants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  liable	  than	  Nation	  B’s	  non-­‐combatants	  (assume	  
Nation	  B	  is	  also	  now	  the	  aggressor).	  Let’s	  also	  assume,	  generously,	  that	  if	  Nation	  
A’s	  combatants	  participate	   in	  Siege	  1,	   every	  act	  of	   intentional	  killing	  runs	  a	  0.3	  
chance	  of	  killing	  a	  non-­‐liable	  person,	  whereas	  if	  they	  participate	  in	  Siege	  2	  every	  
act	  of	  killing	  runs	  a	  0.95	  chance	  of	  killing	  a	  non-­‐liable	  person.24	  The	  argument-­‐
from-­‐risk	   aims	   to	   show	   that	   these	   facts	   can	   explain	   why	   the	   non-­‐reductive	  
permission	   does	   not	   permit	   participation	   in	   Siege	   2	   while	   permitting	  
participation	  in	  Siege	  1,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  each	  act	  of	  killing	  in	  Siege	  2	  is	  more	  
morally	   objectionable	   than	   each	   act	   of	   killing	   in	  Siege	  1.	  However,	   this	   ignores	  
the	  important	  fact	  that	  Siege	  1	  involves	  more	  acts	  of	  killing	  than	  Siege	  2.	  Taking	  
this	  into	  consideration,	  it	  is	  true	  of	  each	  of	  Nation	  A’s	  combatants	  that	  they	  will	  
be	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  3,000	  people	  who	  are	  near-­‐certainly	  non-­‐liable	  if	  
they	  participate	   in	  Option	  1	  (10,000	  x	  0.3),	  whereas	   they	  will	  be	   taking	  part	   in	  
the	  killing	  of	  2,850	  people	  who	  are	  near-­‐certainly	  non-­‐liable	  if	  they	  participate	  in	  
Option	  2	  (3000	  x	  0.95).	  Once	  we	  take	  numbers	  into	  consideration,	  the	  moral	  risk	  
proposal	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  provide	  much	  protection	  for	  non-­‐combatants.	  
	  
5.5	  Appealing	  to	  additional	  target-­‐centred	  facts	  III:	  Vulnerability	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  assumptions	  are	  generous	  in	  two	  respects:	  (i)	  There	  is	  a	  large	  difference	  in	  liability	  
probabilities	  between	  the	  groups,	  while	  (ii)	  keeping	  the	  proportion	  of	  combatants	  who	  are	  non-­‐
liable	  sufficiently	  high	  to	  support	  Lazar’s	  objections	  to	  reductivism.	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One	  further	  proposal,	  endorsed	  by	  several	  authors,	  appeals	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  non-­‐
combatants	  in	  war	  are	  especially	  defenceless	  or	  vulnerable	  to	  harm	  as	  grounding	  
the	   prohibition	   on	   targeting	   them.25	  The	   basic	   idea	   is	   that	   there	   is	   something	  
significantly	   and	   independently	  morally	   objectionable	   about	   harming	   a	   person	  
who	   is	   vulnerable,	   which	   gives	   rise	   to	   a	   general	   humanitarian	   duty	   to	   refrain	  
from	  doing	  so.	  	  
If	  defensible,	  this	  may	  provide	  a	  means	  of	  avoiding	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	  
Non-­‐reductivists	  may	  argue	  that	  while	  the	  relevant	  agent-­‐centred	  considerations	  
can	  override	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  intentionally	  kill	  the	  non-­‐liable,	  they	  are	  insufficient	  
to	   override	   this	   duty	  and	   the	   duty	   not	   to	   harm	   the	   vulnerable	   in	   combination.	  
This	  limits	  the	  range	  of	  actions	  that	  a	  non-­‐reductive	  view	  permits	  in	  war.	  Since,	  
by	  hypothesis,	  non-­‐combatants	  typically	  exhibit	  the	  duty-­‐generating	  property	  of	  
vulnerability	   in	  wartime	  whereas	  combatants	  generally	  do	  not,	  only	  attacks	  on	  
non-­‐liable	  combatants	  are	  rendered	  permissible	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  non-­‐reductivist	  
considerations,	  whereas	  attacks	  on	  non-­‐liable	  non-­‐combatants	  are	  not.26	  	  
This	   response	   can	   be	   challenged	   on	   two	   fronts.	   Firstly,	   we	   can	   question	  
whether	   the	   property	   of	   vulnerability	   really	   does	   generate	   an	   additional	   and	  
significant	  constraint	  on	  harming.	  Consider	  the	  following	  example:	  
	  
Bandits:	  A	  gang	  of	  bandits	  plan	  to	  steal	   the	  possessions	  of	  a	  group	  of	   innocent	  
villagers,	  thereby	  reducing	  the	  villagers	  to	  poverty.	  The	  bandits	  can	  achieve	  their	  
aim	   in	   one	   of	   two	   ways.	   The	   first	   involves	   lethally	   targeting	   10	   villagers	   at	  
random.	   This	   option	   gives	   the	   victims	   a	   10%	   chance	   of	   survival,	   since	   the	  
villagers	  may	  be	  able	  to	  hide	  from	  their	  attackers.	  	  The	  second	  involves	  providing	  
the	  villagers	  with	  10	  slingshots	  and	  then	  lethally	  targeting	  the	  10	  villagers	  who	  
opt	   to	   arm	   themselves.	   Again,	   this	   option	   gives	   the	   victims	   a	   10%	   chance	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  For	  versions	  of	  this	  view,	  see	  Lazar	  (2013:	  40-­‐41);	  May	  (2007:	  67-­‐117);	  Meisels	  (2012);	  Shue	  	  
(1978).	  
26	  As	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   appeal	   to	   vulnerability	   may	   help	   substantiate	   the	   argument-­‐from-­‐
cowardice	  discussed	  above.	  The	  thought	  being	  that	  the	  constraint	  on	  acts	  of	  killing	  that	  manifest	  
cowardice	  is	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  constraint	  on	  attacking	  the	  vulnerable.	  Vulnerability	  may	  
also	   provide	   a	   way	   of	   rehabilitating	   the	   Walzerian	   thought	   that	   the	   permission	   to	   target	  
combatants	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  combatants	  pose	  threats,	  since	  presumably	  the	  ability	  to	  
pose	   a	   threat	   negates	   an	   individual’s	   vulnerability,	   even	   if	   does	   not	   vitiate	   their	   right	   not	   be	  
killed.	  	  
	   23	  
survival,	  since	  the	  villagers	  may	  be	  lucky	  enough	  to	  avoid	  being	  killed	  by	  slinging	  
gravel	  into	  their	  assailants’	  eyes.	  
	  
If	  it	  were	  true	  that	  attacks	  on	  individuals	  who	  are	  both	  vulnerable	  and	  non-­‐liable	  
are	  significantly	  morally	  worse	  than	  attacks	  on	  individuals	  who	  exhibit	  only	  the	  
property	   of	   non-­‐liability,	   we	  would	   expect	   to	   judge	   that	   the	   bandits	   act	  much	  
more	   objectionably	   if	   they	   kill	   10	   villagers	   via	   the	   first	   option	   rather	   than	   the	  
second.	  But	  this	  isn’t	  the	  case.	  Both	  options	  are	  intuitively	  morally	  on	  a	  par.	  This	  
result	   gives	   reason	   to	   doubt	   that	   the	   property	   of	   vulnerability	   has	   the	   moral	  
significance	   required	   to	   constrain	   the	   non-­‐reductive	   permission	   to	   kill	   in	   war	  
and	  thereby	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	  	  
Of	   course,	   perhaps	   one	   does	   not	   share	   this	   intuition.	   However,	   even	   if	   we	  
grant	  that	  vulnerability	  has	   independent	  moral	  significance,	   it	  remains	  unlikely	  
that	   it	   is	   sufficiently	   weighty	   to	   enable	   a	   defence	   of	   non-­‐reductivism.	   To	  
demonstrate	  this,	  consider	  the	  following	  variations	  on	  the	  Bandits	  example:	  
	  
Bandits	  2:	  Exactly	   the	  same	  as	  Bandits,	   except	   that	   the	   first	  option	   (where	   the	  
villagers	  hide)	  gives	  the	  villagers	  a	  20%	  chance	  of	  survival.	  
	  
Bandits	  3:	  Exactly	  the	  same	  as	  Bandits,	  except	  that	  the	  second	  option	  (where	  the	  
villagers	   defend	   themselves	   with	   slingshots)	   involves	   killing	   one	   additional	  
villager.	  
	  
In	   these	   variations	   it	   seems	   uncontroversial	   that	   the	   bandits	   would	   act	   more	  
wrongfully,	   all-­‐things-­‐considered,	   if	   they	  opt	   for	   the	   second	  option	   rather	   than	  
the	   first.	   If	   they	  are	  going	   to	  do	  one	  of	   the	   two,	   they	  ought	   to	   choose	   the	   first.	  
Similarly,	  if	  a	  third-­‐party	  could	  affect	  which	  option	  the	  bandits	  take,	  they	  would	  
have	  strong	  moral	  reason	  to	  cause	  them	  to	  take	  the	  first	  option	  over	  the	  second.	  
This	  result	  suggests	  that	  whatever	  moral	  significance	  vulnerability	  may	  have,	  
it	   can	   be	   overridden	   by	   relatively	   small	   variations	   in	   other	   morally	   relevant	  
factors.	  	  Given	  this,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  appealing	  to	  an	  independent	  constraint	  
on	   harming	   the	   vulnerable	   can	   provide	   an	   alternative	   basis	   for	   the	   standard	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prohibition	  on	  targeting	  non-­‐combatants	  in	  war,	  since	  this	  prohibition	  is	  meant	  
to	  be	  extremely	  stringent.	  
A	   second	   type	   of	   challenge	   may	   be	   raised	   over	   whether	   the	   properties	   of	  
vulnerability	   and	   non-­‐vulnerability,	   even	   if	   sufficiently	   morally	   significant,	  
successfully	   track	   the	   desired	   distinction	   between	   non-­‐combatants	   and	  
combatants.	   The	   concept	   of	   vulnerability	   obviously	   requires	   much	   greater	  
elaboration,	  but	  it	  seems	  natural	  to	  understand	  the	  core	  idea	  as	  grounded	  in	  an	  
individual’s	   inability	   or	   powerlessness	   to	   avoid	   threats	   of	   harm.	   There	   are	   at	  
least	   two	   ways	   in	   which	   an	   individual	   may	   suffer	   from	   this	   inability.	   Most	  
obviously,	   an	   individual	   may	   lack	   means	   of	   defence	   against	   a	   threat.	  
Alternatively,	   an	   individual	   may	   lack	   an	   ability	   to	   remove	   themselves	   from	   a	  
threat	   of	   harm,	   by	   fleeing	   for	   example.	   The	   intuition	   driving	   the	   distinction	  
between	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	   in	  terms	  of	  vulnerability	  rests	  on	  the	  
seemingly	  plausible	  assumption	   that	  non-­‐combatants	  are	   relevantly	  vulnerable	  
to	   a	   far	   greater	   extent	   than	   combatants.	   This	   assumption	   explains	   why	   the	  
humanitarian	   duty	   not	   to	   harm	   the	   vulnerable	   prohibits	   only	   attacks	   on	   the	  
former	  and	  not	  the	  latter,	  thus	  providing	  a	  response	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	  
However,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  Attacks	  on	  many	  combatants	  
seem	  to	  constitute	  breaches	  of	  a	  humanitarian	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  vulnerable	  
(if	   such	   a	   duty	   exists).	   Understanding	   vulnerability	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   inability	   to	  
offer	   defence	   against	   harm,	   it	   seems	   clearly	   true	   that	   combatants	   are	   often	  
completely	   unable	   to	   defend	   themselves	   from	   attack	   in	   war.	   In	   particular,	  
consider	   the	  means	  by	  which	  modern	  wars	   are	   fought,	   at	   long	   range	   and	  with	  
overwhelming	   force.	   The	   typical	   combatant	   harmed	   in	  war	   does	   not	   ‘go	   down	  
fighting’.	  Rather	   they	  are	  struck	  down	  by	  an	  unseen	  enemy	  whom	  they	  had	  no	  
real	   chance	   of	   defending	   themselves	   against.	   Consider,	   once	   more,	   the	   Siege	  
cases.	   Imagine,	   plausibly,	   that	   each	   strategy	   involves	   shelling	   the	   enemy	   from	  
distance.	  Does	  it	  really	  seem	  plausible	  to	  maintain	  that	  those	  targeted	  in	  Siege	  1	  
are	  not	  relevantly	  vulnerable,	  whereas	  those	  who	  would	  be	  targeted	  by	  the	  same	  
methods	  in	  Siege	  2	  are?	  Whether	  an	  individual	  is	  rendered	  vulnerable	  due	  to	  an	  
inability	  to	  resist	  being	  harmed	  seems	  to	  depend	  less	  on	  whether	  they	  fulfil	  the	  
role	  of	  combatant	  or	  non-­‐combatant	  and	  more	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  force	  is	  
used	  against	  them.	  The	  necessary	  assumption	  that	  attacks	  on	  combatants	  rarely	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constitute	  a	  breach	  of	   a	  duty	  not	   to	  harm	   the	  vulnerable	   seems	   to	   trade	  on	  an	  
implausibly	  romanticised	  view	  of	  in	  war	  in	  which	  opponents	  give	  their	  enemies	  
‘a	  fighting	  chance’.	  	  
Drawing	   the	   desired	   distinction	   is	   also	   problematic	   if	   we	   understand	  
vulnerability	   in	   terms	  of	   an	   individual’s	   inability	   to	   remove	   themselves	   from	  a	  
threat	  of	  harm.	  This	  is	  because	  in	  many	  cases	  non-­‐combatants	  will	  be	  better	  able	  
to	   remove	   themselves	   from	   threats	   than	   combatants	   are.	   Whereas	   non-­‐
combatants	   may	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   flee	   the	   fighting,	   this	   option	   is	   less	  
available	  to	  combatants	  who	  will	  often	  face	  serious,	  perhaps	  lethal,	  sanction	  for	  
fleeing	  the	  threats	  they	  face	  in	  battle.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  that	  non-­‐combatants	  
and	  refugees	  are	  not	  vulnerable,	  but	   that	   if	   they	  are	  (and	  surely	   they	  are)	   then	  
many	  combatants	  will	  also	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  an	  equivalent	  or	  greater	  extent,	  since	  
non-­‐combatants	   often	   possess	   a	   degree	   of	   control	   over	   their	   fates	   which	  
combatants	  lack.	  
The	  preceding	  observations	  are	  designed	   to	  show	  that	  even	   if	  we	  grant	   the	  
existence	  of	  an	   independent	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  vulnerable,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  
appealing	   to	   this	   duty	   will	   assist	   non-­‐reductivists	   in	   arguing,	   contra	   the	   war-­‐
crimes	  objection,	  that	  their	  view	  can	  support	  both	  the	  permissive	  and	  restrictive	  
components	  of	   the	  traditional	   in	  bello	  principle	  of	  discrimination.	   If	   this	  duty	   is	  
able	   to	   constrain	   a	   non-­‐reductive	   view	   from	   permitting	   attacks	   on	   non-­‐
combatants,	   it	  will	  also	  often	  prevent	  the	  view	  from	  permitting	  the	  targeting	  of	  
combatants.	  
To	  conclude,	  it	  is	  worth	  emphasising	  a	  general	  point	  that	  is	  present	  in	  some	  
of	  the	  specific	  objections	  I	  have	  put	  forward	  in	  this	  section.	  This	   is	  that	  even	  if,	  
contra	   my	   arguments,	   one	   accepts	   that	   the	   considerations	   canvassed	   above	  
provide	  genuine	  moral	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  targeting	  non-­‐liable	  combatants	  over	  
non-­‐liable	   non-­‐combatants,	   this	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   show	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	  
can	  be	  made	  safe	   from	  the	  war	  crimes	  objection.	   In	  order	   to	  do	  so,	   it	  must	  not	  
only	   be	   shown	   that	   these	   considerations	   generate	   reasons,	   but	   also	   that	   these	  
reasons	   are	   sufficiently	   weighty	   to	   prohibit	   the	   targeting	   of	   non-­‐liable	   non-­‐
combatants	  even	  when	  other	  considerations	  –	  the	  numbers	  of	   innocent	   lives	  at	  
stake	   most	   obviously	   –	   weigh	   in	   favour	   of	   doing	   so.	   Satisfying	   this	   second	  
requirement	  is	  no	  less	  a	  challenge	  that	  satisfying	  the	  first.	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6.	  Conclusion	  
	  
I	   have	   argued	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	   should	   be	   rejected	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   it	  
cannot	  support	  the	  most	  intuitive	  and	  uncontroversial	  restrictions	  on	  intentional	  
killing	  in	  war.	  These	  are	  most	  naturally	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  target-­‐centred	  
fact	  of	  non-­‐liability,	   yet	  non-­‐reductivists	  are	   committed	   to	   the	  view	   that	   this	   is	  
not	  generally	  sufficient	  to	  render	  targeting	  impermissible.	  	  
Of	   course,	   the	   argument	   offered	   here	   provides	   only	   negative	   support	   for	   a	  
reductivist	  approach,	  by	  eliminating	  its	  main	  rival.	  Nothing	  said	  here	  shows	  that	  
reductivism	   provides	   an	   independently	   acceptable	   account	   of	   just	   conduct	   in	  
war.	   But	   if	   I	   am	   correct	   that	   non-­‐reductivism	   is	   not	   a	   viable	   alternative,	   the	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